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Whiteness Studies in Japan: Types of Whiteness, Visible and Invisible
Takao Fujikawa
White Australia imagined as multicultural?
Whiteness is an extremely elusive concept. In certain circumstances whiteness is apparent or quite 
visible to some, but it is not visible to others or its very existence might even be denied. Visibility 
or invisibility of whiteness changes with individuals’ and groups’ perspectives and with the societies 
in which they are situated.  
At the fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Australian Studies Association of Japan in 2003, 
a panel discussion was held mostly to hear the leading businessmen of companies that have 
had a fairly long experience of maintaining a large subsidiary company in Australia. Though 
I cannot remember now what they actually talked about, I was intrigued by their speeches, or 
rather the framework they used to describe the Australian business world. Despite conscious 
and unconscious efforts on the part of Australian governments, academics, the media, as well as 
Japanese scholars, to depict and imagine Australian society as multicultural, these businessmen all 
referred to Australian society repeatedly as white, without mentioning any diversity in it. Australia 
is ‘a white nation,’ run by ‘white men,’ distinguished by the ‘white man’s way.’ While white 
supremacy may be ‘a fantasy in a multicultural society,’ it is quite real and probably the only reality 
to these businessmen. Moreover, they work very successfully with this reality in their minds. On 
the one hand they learn and cope with the white man’s way. On the other hand, they are critical 
of its inefficiency and try to avoid its eccentricity. 
Japanese scholars and commentators on Australian society, because they are supposed to be 
more  objective, do not represent Australian society or Australian academic circles as white. While 
they usually point to various discriminations, they focus on the diversity and multicultural aspects 
of society. Which version of Australian society is ‘more real’ or ‘more truthful?’ Such a question 
may be in itself meaningless in our post-modern world. Yet does the post-modernity eventually 
belong to ‘our’ side of the world? 
The Japanese businessmen did not mention any incident of racial discrimination against 
them or any physical marker of whiteness. They never accuse Australians of racism. This suggests 
that their description is much deeper than an apparent observation of Australian society, though 
their expression seems to be harsh and offensive to the civilized ear. It is possible that they are 
simply naming a structural domination of whiteness, for example, described by Ruth Frankenberg 
as ‘the unmarked marker … unexamined ― unqualified, essential, homogenous, seemingly self-
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fashioned, and apparently unmarked by history or practice.’  
(1)
 Then what are we, as Japanese 
scholars, doing by analysing and describing Australian society without paying attention to 
unmarked whiteness? What are we doing by submerging ourselves under academic practice 
without noticing unmarked, structural whiteness? I believe that my standpoint is very tenuous 
with respect to whiteness.
I am not in a position to tell even roughly how Japanese scholars think of whiteness in the 
Australian academic world and extendedly in English-speaking academia. Instead, I want to tell 
you my personal experience and offer my explanation of it. 
More than twenty years ago when I was a student, I wanted to be admitted into a post-
graduate course in history at one Australian university. When I wrote to a possible supervisor 
about my proposal for research, I was strongly advised to study Japanese attitudes to ‘White 
Australia’ policy. Though this advice seems natural in view of my language skills and the state of 
research at that time in Australia, it was against my intention and against the purpose of studying 
abroad since the Japanese attitudes could be more easily and efficiently studied in Japan. I wanted 
to know and examine the Australian part of the story. 
I may say that the letter I received directly and indirectly suggested that the history of the 
White Australian part of the White Australia policy was fully examined by white Australian 
historians, if I am here allowed to be as bold as the above Japanese businessmen. That advice 
sounded like ‘we have finished major part of history to which you, Asians could add nothing but 
minor revisions by studying Asians.’ The entire picture of the puzzle belongs to whites and Asians 
may add pieces by studying only Asians, according to this position. Can the ‘Chinese puzzle’ be 
solved only by white Australians in the 850s as well as now? Now we often see Asian scholars play 
Asian parts or repeat the repertoire of white scholarship for token representation. 
Unmarked and unnamed whiteness is always arguable. As the roles Asians play on the 
multicultural platform are certainly empowering them, so the whiteness of unmarked whiteness 
could be vehemently denied by Asians. A Japanese scholar at a session, ‘Whiteness in Asian 
Contexts and ‘Asia’ in Western Constructs,’ will happily deny the whiteness of the session. But this 
conference could be suitably called a ‘white conference’ from a different viewpoint. 
The elusiveness of whiteness does not end here. I want to introduce two Japanese women 
today. The first one is Yuri Ebihara who was the best-known fashion model in Japan in 2006. An 
article says, ‘You can’t go anywhere without seeing her face in Japan.’ Her nickname is Ebichan 
and she is popularly called by this name. Ebi means prawns in Japanese and McDonald’s Japan 
employed her for the promotion of the Ebi-burger, a kind of prawn burger,  and it was an instant 
success because of her popularity among young Japanese women. 
The second woman is Michiko Hamamura, who was a popular singer in Japan about fifty 
() Ruth Frankenberg, ed., Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism (Durham: Duke University Press, 997), 
p. , p. 5; see also Ross Chambers, “The Unexamined,” in Whiteness: A Critical Reader, ed., by Mike Hill (New York: New 
York University Press, 997), pp. 88–89.
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years ago. She sang a Japanese version of the Banana Boat Song by Harry Belafonte. She was the 
first Japanese woman who dyed her hair brown and her hairstyle and make-up became known as 
the Calypso style. Although the song originally came from black Jamaican workers, Hamamura’
s appearance did not look like a Caribbean woman. She wanted to be like a Westerner. She dyed 
her hair and pioneered a new make-up in order to look like a Westerner. The crooked nature of 
such cultural transfer is a very interesting subject, but I do not treat this problem here.
When we look at the pictures of the two women, they look quite similar. It may be asserted 
that the basic perception of the female beauty in Japan has not changed much for half a century, 
but that is not my point. I do not argue here that the present Japanese woman’s ideal of beauty is 
Western or white. Ebichan and her followers do not consciously want to be Westerners any more. 
They are pursuing the beauty according to their own tastes whose magic word is ‘pretty’ or ‘cute,’ 
or kawaii in Japanese. They are seeking the Japanese ideal of beauty, though the ideal is identical 
with the style Hamamura regarded as Western. The Western style, a version of whiteness, could 
be absorbed as Japanese proper on a personal conscious level. The form of whiteness sometimes 
rapidly changes its meaning.
Then what can we do with such an elusive concept? We must acknowledge that whiteness is 
simultaneously visible and invisible in a broad range of circumstances including academia. We will 
have to name unmarked whiteness, an ‘objective’ structure of academic practice. This must be  a 
very difficult and dangerous task, I believe, as scholarly practice is constantly under attack from a 
white nationalist ideology in a country like Australia.  
(2)
 We also need a theory or map of whiteness 
which names invisible whiteness in relation to visible whiteness over a long time span. We need a 
theory that is not binding, but that helps us obtain a larger perspective of connectedness among 
various manifestations of whiteness. We must attempt to make clear the relationship between 
the visible whiteness and the invisible whiteness for historical analysis. We also need the people 
of colour, who play the role of anthropologists on white tribes. This will reveal many aspects of 
invisible whiteness. 
Whiteness as unmarked?
If asked about whiteness studies in Japan, I can say confidently that there are not many except 
super-nationalistic ones. Thus I decided to set up a research project on whiteness in Japan a few 
years ago. I headed a research team on whiteness at the National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 
from 2002 to 2004. The name of the project was ‘the structuring of whiteness in the world.’ I was 
told later that this was the first project at the museum that contained ‘in the world’ in the name of 
the research project. The research projects are usually confined to particular themes, areas or tribes. 
(2) See Keith Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Vol. 1, Van Dieman's Land 1803-1847 (Sydney: Macleay Press, 
2002); Robert Manne, ed., Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal History (Melbourne: Black Inc., 
2003); Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003).
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I was probably allowed to use that expression because I am not an anthropologist, but a historian, 
a layman, who does not know what the institution should be. As I am a historian, most of the 
members were also historians. 
In 2002, I eventually ventured into the study of white tribes in the world with a group 
of Japanese researchers. In pursuing the research, the first thing I had to make clear, though 
unwillingly, was to define the object of research that had signifiant, but did not have clear signifié 
or référent.  Studying white tribes is easier for historians, but studying whiteness is not. The 
problem is that ‘whiteness’ is a word decisively detached from ordinary use of language, while 
‘whites’ has been commonly used and is historically understandable.  
(3)
 Whiteness is a word for 
researchers to give meaning to and by doing so construct the object of their study, although they 
would not call it the object as it is assumed to be more abstract. Or whiteness, by the definition 
as ‘unmarked marker, empty signifiant,’ may be essentially without signifié or référent. 
Cynthia Levine-Rasky refers to whiteness as white ‘racefulness,’ an active participant in 
systems of domination. She states that she uses the term ‘whiteness’ to refer to ‘the processes 
through which whites acquire and deploy social dominance’ and ‘to signify a constellation of 
social effects and processes, not their repository in a white body.’ Her intention is ‘to evoke 
the material and symbolic power of whiteness identifying its relationality and contextuality.’  
(4)
 
Frankenberg thinks of whiteness as ‘practice rather than object, in relation to racial formation and 
historical process rather than as isolable or static.’  
(5)
 To some researchers the research task is simpler. 
They attempt to fill the unmarked space of whiteness by subjecting it to scrutiny.  
(6)
 It is now a 
fashionable practice to add ‘whiteness’ to the title of any book related to whites or racism on the 
European side. But isn’t it also problematic to claim whiteness to be an unmarked category and 
simply to make it the focus of study?
Vron Ware poses a similar question from a different point of view. Referring to the work 
of David Roediger, she questions ‘how that whiteness is defined, in the first place, and how 
this research is to be carried out, not just in the United States, but also in different specific and 
comparative locations.’ She also questions how gender, class or sexuality enter into the way in 
which the discursive power of whiteness is perceived, experienced, encountered, and rejected. 
She finally concludes that the student of whiteness requires a map of possibilities and a steady 
compass to make sense of the field.  
(7)
 The map I want to show here is not the map or the compass 
Ware attempted to provide. Still I believe that a provisional map of the historical development of 
(3) I am of the position that the concept of whites or the white race is socially constructed and am not here arguing for their 
‘naturalness’.
(4) Cynthia Levine-Rasky, ed., Working through Whiteness: International Perspectives (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press), 2002, pp. 2-3.
(5) Frankenberg, Displacing Whiteness, p. 20.
(6) Michelle Fine, Lois Weis, Linda C. Powell, and L. Mun Wong, eds., Off White: Readings on Race, Power, and Society, (New 
York: Routledge), 997, viii.
(7) Vron Ware and Les Back, Out of Whiteness: Color, Politics, and Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2002, p. 9, p. 
3.
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whiteness in the globalizing world is necessary to navigate the structured racial order.
What role can history play in whiteness studies in concert with other disciplines? Frankenberg 
originally conceived of whiteness in three ways as a location of structural advantage, of race 
privilege; a standpoint, a place from which white people look at themselves , at others, and at 
society; a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed.  
(8)
 The simultaneous 
strength and weakness with this sociological definition is that whiteness is replaceable with other 
categories such as Japaneseness or maleness. For example, we can easily adapt the definition to 
critically observe Japaneseness in Japan as a natural, unmarked category. It is true that whiteness 
has often worked through nationality, membership in a nation-state, and that such extended use 
of the definition may be productive. But we may lose sight of the specific aspects of whiteness 
with Frankenberg’s definition. Whiteness is beyond national membership and far more influential 
in constituting the globalizing world order. Another problem is that whiteness is not necessarily 
natural or unmarked.
Frankenberg later argues that ‘the notion of whiteness as unmarked norm is revealed to be 
a mirage, or at least a phenomenon delimited in time and space.’ She states ‘In the historical 
moment with which Horsman is concerned, whiteness was not normative and thus unseen and 
unmarked, but rather named, marked, and still in the making.’ Frankenberg means that whiteness 
was in the making and visible in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century, while 
whiteness as unmarked marker belongs to a ‘rather recent, historical moment.’ The version of 
‘whiteness as norm, as transparency, as national/natural state of being’ has been handed down to 
‘many of us’ through historical processes. ‘Whiteness attains (usually unstable) unmarkedness’ 
where white supremacy has been achieved.  
(9)
The limitation of whiteness as unmarked norm is no doubt a cliché to Australian historians 
who have the most marked of marked whiteness in the dreams of White Australia. Similarly the 
historical transition indicated by Frankenberg, from marked to unmarked, seems to apply to 
Australian experience as well. However, is it possible to explain away the relationship of marked 
whiteness and unmarked whiteness only in terms of the extent of white supremacy? As whiteness 
is always a relative term and essentially an analytical word manipulated by researchers, if my 
argument is accepted, we should try to make clear at least the signifié and référent, the historical 
context and the relationship of the two versions of whiteness. 
Whiteness in contradiction?
Warren Montag argues that a ‘universal was one of the forms in which the white race historically 
appeared’ and that ’whiteness is itself the human universal that no (other) race realizes.’ This 
(8) Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press), 993, p. .
(9) Frankenberg, Displacing Whiteness, p. 5, p. 9, pp. 5-6.
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argument is not contradictory to the conception of whiteness as an empty, unmarked category, 
but the problem is its temporal sequence. According to him, whiteness as unmarked is supposed 
to be inherent to Enlightenment philosophy. We are still imprisoned in the limits set by the 
whiteness within the discursive network in the age of the Enlightenment. We therefore have been 
trapped in such unmarked whiteness for at least two and a half centuries. In his reasoning the 
unmarked whiteness discursively predates the whiteness in the making in the nineteenth century. 
How should we conceive of this version of whiteness?  
(10)
Though I feel an impulsive aversion to the emphasis placed on the Enlightenment by a 
Euro-centred theorist, I find insightful his argument that ‘whether, since whiteness is not logically 
confined to the status of a particularism but can be conceived as one possible form of universalism, 
the category or attribute of whiteness has functioned historically in opposition to universalism.’  
(11)
 
It seems to me that the two versions of whiteness, whiteness unmarked and whiteness 
marked, existed in opposition to each other in theory, but at the same time reinforced each 
other by this opposition in reality, or contextually. I want to attempt to locate the two versions of 
whiteness and their historical relationship to each other and to class, gender and nation.
Since whites as a group or as a race have never been determined by physical characteristics, 
that is, a social construct, socially and historically changing, they always need to be supported by 
the attribute circumscribed by society. The whites, the white race, a race among a variety of races, 
has a relatively definite attribute, visible whiteness or marked whiteness, while the white as a man, 
representative of humanity, has an indefinite attribute, invisible whiteness or unmarked whiteness. 
I may be able to say that the latter’s signifiant is man; its signifié is a composite of whiteness and 
humanity or nationality; its référent is the dominant group in society. 
In the early nineteenth century, Georges Cuvier, a French naturalist and chancellor of the 
University of Paris, who ‘scientifically’ divided homo sapiens into three subspecies and exerted 
a great influence on later racial theorists and popular images of races, regarded the Caucasians 
as superior to other races.  
(12)
 The white race, visible whiteness, or marked whiteness, like Cuvier’s 
theory, combined human physical differences with cultural and mental qualities and asserted the 
superiority of the white race over non-white races. The marked whiteness needs a white body for 
its representation and asserts the dominance and superiority of the white race based on biological 
or hereditary qualification. The white body is at the root of whiteness and whiteness is limited to 
those with a white body.
The other form of whiteness, invisible or unmarked whiteness, appears as the norm of 
humans. In the age of imperialism norms of white nations and white middle classes functioned 
as the standards of civilization, the yardstick on which cultures of non-whites could be measured. 
Whiteness was represented as acquirable by any race or nation. In this sense whiteness is universal. 
(0) Warren Montag, “The Universalization of Whiteness: Racism and enlightenment,” in Whiteness: A Critical Reader, p. 285, p. 
292.
() Ibid., p. 285.
(2) Michael Banton, Racial Theories, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 998, p. 46.
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Savages and heathens could be civilized. Within contemporary nation-states that claim to be 
multicultural societies, such as Australia, nationality or the membership of the nation with 
associated national culture, functions in a similar way within national boundaries. Whiteness is 
open to non-whites, while being restrictive in a number of ways. The importance of the body 
as a physical marker of human groups has gradually diminished because of the development of 
technology of identification of individuals. This has made whiteness more accessible to a number 
of non-white groups, while whiteness is retained as the standard of normal human beings. 
Whiteness as the norms of humanity often transforms itself from the ideal human to the ideal 
member of the nation-state. Since humanity was closely related to the emerging French nation-
state in revolutionary France, humanity became inseparable from Frenchness. Frenchness then 
grew increasingly white in the nineteenth century. In the British Empire, Englishness and later 
Britishness often functioned as the standard of civilization or the norms of humanity. Invisible 
whiteness has been historically underscored by visible whiteness as well. Theoretical accessibility 
has been circumscribed by actual restriction. On the other hand, as modern democracy was 
created within nation-states, whiteness constituted the basis of democracy through the medium 
of white nationality in major Western states. Probably the development of democratic institutions 
helped establish whiteness more directly than the foundational Enlightenment. This is especially 
true of countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada, where the boundary of the 
nation was supposed to largely overlap with that of race. 
The two versions of whiteness have existed side-by-side in the subjectivity of the colonized 
and non-whites who faced the dominance of white nations in the ideology and policies towards 
non-white nations and peoples, and in the public identity and political and social spheres of 
Western nations. Unmarked whiteness, by suggesting the norms to which non-whites can 
subscribe, offers a possibility for non-whites to accommodate themselves to whiteness and to take 
an active part in the power structure while  marked whiteness denies such a possibility at the same 
time.
Frantz Fanon describes the split self of the colonized in the Antilles, a French colony where 
people had to adopt the norms of France in order to be more civilized, more human and thus 
to be whiter. This gave them honorary, but not full citizenship. Marked whiteness or blackness 
prevented them from fully embracing whiteness as humanity. At the turn of the last century, the 
British Empire espoused the equality of races while acknowledging the right of white colonies 
to restrict non-white immigration. Japan demanded free entry for its nationals into Australia 
by asserting that it reached the standards of civilized nations. The standards of civilization were 
offered as a possibility for Japan to become a great power among Western nations, but their 
nationals were denied entry to Australia because of racial descrimination. India and China were 
in a similar position. In the clash of the unmarked whiteness as standards of civilization and the 
marked whiteness based on racism, Australia was forced to adopt a language test as a method 
of restricting non-white immigrants for the purpose of making whiteness invisible. The British 
espousal of equality of races was not simply a hypocritical fake as Gandhi’s activity in South Africa 
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reveals. The adoption of British living standards and British subjecthood were the ground for the 
Indian claim of civil rights.
The two versions of whiteness are two sides of the same coin. Still it is useful to think of them 
as separate in order to conceive of the changing nature of whiteness in the last two centuries. 
Four types of whiteness
I want to use the phrase ‘peripheral whiteness’ to refer to the whiteness more clearly marked in 
the body, or more visible whiteness. This whiteness has often appeared as various categories of the 
white race such as the Aryans, the Caucasians, the Germans, the Anglo-Saxons. I use the word 
‘peripheral’ because it is often expressed by groups with white identity marginal in class, ethnicity 
and in the world structure.  
(13)
 These white groups need to vociferously assert whiteness since they 
lack the economic and social advantage usually associated with physical whiteness. 
On the other hand I want to use the phrase ‘dominant whiteness’ to indicate the more 
invisible or less marked whiteness. I use the word ‘dominant’ because it is often expressed by 
groups with white identity dominant in class, ethnicity and in the world structure. Physical 
markers of whiteness are secondary to such people since the social or geographical distance from 
non-white groups is large enough to secure their dominance.
Figure  illustrates the four types of whiteness in the modern world based on the observation 
of European countries, the United States and British white settler societies and their relations with 
non-European countries and migrants. 
The imperial and multicultural types are versions of dominant whiteness while the 
republican and racist types are versions of peripheral whiteness. Dominant here again means 
that whiteness shows less markedness, while peripheral means that whiteness is more visible. All 
the types embrace both visible whiteness and invisible whiteness, but in the dominant versions 
unmarked whiteness prevails while in the peripheral versions marked whiteness prevails. In the 
dominant types invisible whiteness is more prevalent in the multicultural type than in the imperial 
type. In the peripheral types visible whiteness is more prevalent in the racist type than in the 
republican type.
Historical examples will elucidate the four types of whiteness. Those bearers of the peripheral 
whiteness are usually peripheral white groups as I mentioned. The typical group is Irish workers 
described by David Roediger in The Wages of Whiteness. Similarly in late nineteenth century British 
white colonies, the white colonial working class, because of the marginality as a colony in terms of 
its geographical, cultural and political location, and also because of the marginality in terms of its 
class status, embraced the peripheral whiteness.  
The white middle class in nineteenth century British colonies were the bearers of the 
(3) E.g., groups with white identity in the periphery or semi-periphery rather than in the core in the schemata proposed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein.
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dominant whiteness, but also partly influenced by the peripheral whiteness because of its 
geographical and structural marginality in the British Empire. Structural and geographical 
location is also important. The white middle class women were in a similar position because of 
the contradictory nature of class and gender mixture. The dominant whiteness was most clearly 
sustained by the upper and middle classes in the imperial centres in nineteenth century Europe —
groups socially and geographically most distant from non-white workers. The dominant whiteness 




 1 Republican type
democracy and liberalism
 particular white civilization
whiteness in the making
defending democracy and nationalism
racism and yellow peril
white national unity
unified national culture
maintaining equality and living standards
protectionist economy and society 
white femininity in peril
 3 Racist type
cultural racism
 white supremacy
whiteness specifically marked in the body
closed whiteness
defending nationalism
racism, Nazism, yellow peril 





 universal white civilization
whiteness marked and unmarked




civilizing mission and Christianity





universal whiteness without the body
open whiteness
spreading liberalism and individualism
colour blindness, cosmopolitanism
multiculturalism, the Enlightenment








(imperial centre, middle class)
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thereafter was embraced by the middle and upper classes in Western nation states that adopted 
multiculturalism or colour blindness. Figure 2 roughly shows the relationship of the two versions 
of whiteness and the white middle and working classes in the late nineteenth century. The major 
contribution of whiteness studies heretofore was in the research on white middle class women and 
white working class men, the two groups that might be thought of as deficient in whiteness either 
in terms of gender or class.  
(14)
 But the role of gender is controversial in the working class. White 
femininity in the working class possibly makes up for the deficiency of whiteness in terms of class 
in certain circumstances.
The republican type of whiteness prevailed in the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa from the second half of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth 
century. These countries made use of whiteness as a basis for the consolidation of national unity. 
Whiteness largely overlay nationhood. The nation tended to be represented as a white body, which 
in turn became the medium for imagining the nation. The white woman became the symbol of 
white civilization. The white woman’s body was said to be threatened with sexual assault by non-
white males and the white nation and civilization represented by white femininity were threatened 
with contamination. White workers asserted the equality of white citizens and the maintenance 
(4) David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 
999); Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century 
America (London: Verso, 990); Vron Ware, Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism, and History (London: Verso, 992); Ruth 
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Whiteness Studies in Japan
of their standards of living, while the dominant classes utilized the workers’ demand for the 
purpose of the unification of the nation-state. The defence of white democracy and national unity 
variously led to the exclusion of non-whites from the nation, work, and a number of spheres of 
life. 
The racist type of whiteness was typically predominant in Nazi Germany and South Africa 
under the apartheid regime mostly during the mid-twentieth century. The republican type was 
affected by the influence of invisible, universal whiteness, but the racist type was almost free from 
or rather antagonistic to universal whiteness. The white race became equivalent to the nation. 
Nationalist border controls became extremely restrictive. Whiteness became almost totally 
dependent upon the white body. However, the body of whites is defined by cultural attributes, 
that is, the body of whites by itself cannot define whiteness. If the racist type is led to the 
extreme conclusion, the white body must be violently and irrationally stipulated. This means the 
annihilation of the space of invisible whiteness, the absolute division of humanity. When invisible 
whiteness is completely eliminated, the culmination of severe discrimination like the genocide 
of the Jews in Nazi Germany ensues. Even today right wing organizations in Western societies 
frequently assert visible whiteness rooted in the white body and demand the creation of exclusively 
white space within the nation. They represent the racist type in contemporary societies, though 
they are apparently in a minority. 
Now the separation of the dominant whiteness and peripheral whiteness has advanced to 
the highest stage. The present difference between the racist and multicultural types is far greater 
than the divergence between the republican and imperial types at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. The dominant whiteness is increasingly invisible, separated from the white body, and the 
peripheral whiteness is becoming more marked, marginal in public support. Still the peripheral 
whiteness retains its influence on considerable sections of society in a disguised form like cultural 
racism.
The imperial type of whiteness was typically predominant in the British and French 
Empires from the second half of the nineteenth century to the first part of the twentieth century. 
Whiteness is presented as the ultimate form of universal human identity. Non-whites who did not 
sufficiently possess whiteness were encouraged to reach the ultimate form through Christianization 
and civilizing missions. Democracy and liberalism were presented as the common standards for 
humans, but it was a future possibility, not a reality for non-whites who tried to acquire whiteness. 
After the Second World War, the British Colonial Office attempted to promote the education for 
citizenship in black African colonies, but their independence and the establishment of democratic 
institutions were scheduled to take place in an unforeseeable distant future. The British Empire 
offered the universal principles for the imperial reign, but it was impossible for non-white subjects 
to identify themselves thoroughly with the invisible whiteness couched in universal humanity. 
The white middle class women were represented as the symbol for Christianity and civilization. 
They were typically categorized as the lady traveller or lady missionary. White femininity was not 
something that was menaced with non-white contagion, but it was thought of as the vanguard 
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of human civilization. The white woman was the model for universal humanity and white 
feminists moved within this framework in the imperial context. The imperial type presupposes 
the hierarchy of whites in terms of ethnicity and class and it recognizes the existence of a variety of 
cultures in stratified ranks. 
More transparent or invisible than the imperial type is the multicultural type of whiteness. 
The multicultural type appeared when the imperial and republican types increasingly lost 
legitimacy after the Second World War. The old European empires have disintegrated and white 
settler societies and European societies have become diversified within the state in terms of racial 
and ethnic mixture. The multicultural whiteness is particularly dominant in countries such as the 
United States, Canada, Australia and Britain. Whiteness is more open to non-whites and societies 
have become more liberal and tolerant towards non-whites than in the republican type. In the 
multicultural type not only whiteness is represented as universal humanity, but also it approves 
cultural diversity. Particular cultures are recognized to be equal to each other under comprehensive 
universal humanity or nationhood. Whiteness is thrown open to the bearers of various cultures. 
The significance of the white body is minimized, and therefore non-whites with different physical 
features can acquire whiteness and thus become like whites in almost every aspect of life. However, 
this invisible whiteness is not inconsistent with imperialistic domination or civilizing mission. It 
even legitimates military attacks. While whiteness now could be shared by individuals with a wide 
range of racial and ethnic backgrounds, it tends to lose some characteristics of universal humanity 
because it was more firmly embraced by nationalism. Humanity and national membership are 
often equated, though the advent of universal citizenship is asserted by scholars as well as activists. 
It is thus possible to replace the whiteness in Frankenberg’s definition with Japaneseness. The 
multicultural type of whiteness sometimes vindicates its legitimacy by denouncing the racist type 
of whiteness. The multicultural type of whiteness could claim to be different from racism and 
function as a unifying principle of the nation-state. Whiteness is universalized within nationhood 
and has become invisible. 
The multicultural type of whiteness, from our contemporary perspective, is the most 
powerful whiteness. The imperial type and republican types follow it and the racist type is the 
weakest. The multicultural type is the most powerful because it could cohabit with democratic 
nation-states and a universal free economic system. On the other hand, the whiteness marked in 
the body and stipulated by law or bound by social custom, is referred to as ‘weak’ whiteness. It is 
described as weak because the fact that whiteness is attributed to the whites, a particular visible 
racial group, would invite criticism against the racially privileged group that uses such discourse. 
In international relations and social circumstances within the more unified nation-states, which 
formally oppose racial discrimination, the pronouncement of white racial privilege would 
endanger the maintenance of white domination by producing a wide range of opposition and 
resistance. Such weakness is conspicuously visible in the contemporary white supremacist groups. 
Pseudo-biological definition of the white race, the Social Darwinism and the Aryanism 
connected with Nazism, were once extremely influential as racial ideology for the justification 
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of the legitimacy of white domination. But the racial ideology was vulnerable to the criticism of 
anti-racist groups because it was based on the white body and that the white body was the basis 
for racial privilege. Under democratic institutions the racial privilege marked in the body was 
theoretically against universalized humanity and often challenged by non-whites. The privilege 
became increasingly costly to maintain and was gradually renounced. The dominant white 
majority apparently broke with such ideology and now only marginal white groups hold on to it.
Whiteness, humanity and nationhood
Whiteness has been closely related to humanity and nationhood in the modern world. Whiteness 
could appear either in the form of universal humanity or in the form of national membership 
and even in both forms at the same time. Whiteness in the shape of universal humanity could be 
accommodated within the imperial framework or national citizenship. As whiteness is inseparable 
from gender in terms of universal humanity, its connection with gender has been well studied 
from such a perspective. Because whiteness being connected to class rather in terms of national 
citizenship, its connection with the working class has been amply analysed. This made it inevitable 
that democracy has lived in symbiosis with racism as whiteness transformed into nationhood both 
in the form of humanity and citizenship. We need to understand the silhouette of the amorphous 
shape of whiteness in changing circumstances in extended areas of research.
It is absolutely necessary to assume the existence of invisible whiteness well before the 
twentieth century and to historically clarify the relationship between visible whiteness and invisible 
whiteness in a long-term perspective. Invisible whiteness, as the standards of civilization, was the 
power to create international order at the turn of the last century, while marked whiteness was 
asserted by former white settler societies to uphold their immigration restriction policies. At an 
individual level, the subjectivity of non-whites was ambivalently affected by the contradictory 
dominance of whiteness; both by the accommodating invisible whiteness and excluding marked 
whiteness. From international relations down to personal subjectivity, we have an extensive area of 
research in which no one has the final word. If we start to name the whiteness in contemporary 
multicultural, colour-blind societies, historical examination of unmarked whiteness will help 
us understand it from a different and illuminating angle. I hope that this paper will provide a 
provisional map to locate the whiteness in a historical dimension.
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